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To tackle the Covid-19 pandemic, governments need citizens 
to trust messages on behaviour change, and to support more 
draconian steps like lockdowns. Yet, lack of trust in public authority 
and a prevalence of rumours are shaping people’s responses to 
the virus, especially in fragile, conflict-affected places. Action for 
Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) research among poor 
and marginalised households in such areas shows how distrust 
causes serious problems – and how approaches tailored to local 
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Why who is trusted matters in contexts of uncertainty 
Since the start of the pandemic, uncertainty has coursed through 
public discourse about appropriate Covid-19 responses – be it herd 
immunity or ‘test and trace’; masks or no masks – and now about the 
safety and effectiveness of vaccines approved rapidly by governments. 
Unsurprisingly, any official response prompts diverse interpretations and 
a varied reception from the public. Yet, across the world, experience 
unequivocally backs the need for a coordinated response, which 
requires everybody to change behaviour, in a collective and sustained 
way. Achieving this is particularly hard in places where most messages 
from state authorities are viewed sceptically.
Where governments have a history of using misinformation for political 
reasons, or to attract donor funding, or as a strategy for control, such 
scepticism is hardly surprising. Can the Covid-19 pandemic offer an 
opportunity to rebuild trust? Can it help to identify sources of authority 
who are trusted to provide credible information and to protect and 
1 For more discussion of political trust during the pandemic in general, see Political Trust: 
The Glue that Keeps Democracies Together.
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deliver public goods to the poor and 
marginalised?
Serendipitously, our A4EA research 
to understand how people accessed 
‘governance’ at local levels enabled us to 
explore these issues. Using our ‘governance 
diaries’ methodology, we were already 
following poor and marginalised households 
in three countries with fragmented authority, 
conflict, uncertainty and legacies of 
repression. All three are fragile democracies, 
with parts engaged in conflict.2 The presence 
of the state is limited and contested by other 
non-state actors, especially in areas far from 
the capitals. 
We found that poor and marginalised 
households rarely approach public authorities 
directly in these contexts. Instead they 
turn to local brokers and informal leaders 
at community, village, settlement or 
neighbourhood level – we call these people 
‘intermediaries’ and included them in our 
research.3 Knowing the preferences and 
incentives of these intermediaries is part 
of understanding how issues are resolved. 
For example, women report needing to go 
through male intermediaries (they often are 
men) to solve their problems. 
When the pandemic struck, we looked at 
how people and authorities have responded 
to Covid-19 in the three countries. Our key 
finding is that, at the margins, a lack of trust in 
public authority and a prevalence of rumours 
are shaping people’s responses to the virus.  
Six observations from our research 
sites
1. Government information trickles down 
through public officials and the media 
First, the good news: in all our research sites, 
governments are reaching the population with 
information about Covid-19. Mostly this is 
through two channels – public officials and 
the media. Key sources of information for 
marginalised groups are local government 
functionaries – mainly public administration 
officials, but also others – and, in Country A, 
the police and the military. In the three countries, 
authorities send information to local leaders, 
including religious and traditional leaders who 
are expected to disseminate it. Armed groups 
also disseminate information about the 
pandemic through their local structures.  
Local loudspeakers, radio and television 
are used for dissemination. Social media is 
widely used, and people are not just passive 
consumers. There is some awareness among 
intermediaries that these channels might 
spread misinformation. But most importantly, 
person-to-person communication dominates. 
As one person in Country C stated, ‘Besides 
radio, the main way to have information is the 
interpersonal communication, conversations in 
passenger transport, in the market.’
2. Trust in official information varies – and is 
sometimes very low
Second, some more good news: in at least 
one of our research countries, the information 
coming from government is basically 
sound, and viewed as somewhat credible. 
In Country A, a country in transition from 
military rule, people trusted information from 
both government and armed groups not 
aligned to the government. When Covid-19 
cases increased significantly, people started 
following the regulations more assiduously.  
In Country B, messages are mixed. The 
population has long been fed conspiracies, 
so there are alternative theories about the 
information being received. Its credibility 
depends upon whether local intermediaries 
reinforce the messages. Even in Country A, 
where official information is trusted, it sits 
beside rumours and competing narratives 
about Covid-19.
Intermediaries in Country C do not trust 
the information coming from government. 
They call it an ‘invention of the authorities’ 
as they see no evidence about widespread 
2 Countries were anonymised for security reasons.
3 For more information on this ongoing project, see the Governance at the Margins page on the IDS website.
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prevalence or severity. One intermediary 
we spoke to said, ‘the government does not 
show infected people, and this makes people 
conclude that it is a play disease.’
3. Rumours and informal sources of 
information prevail 
Our first phase of ‘governance diaries’ 
research showed that in settings of fragility 
and conflict, and for communities living on 
the margins (of economic power and political 
influence), informal sources of information 
trump formal ones. Unsubstantiated rumours 
rule. Covid-19 is no exception: Countries B 
and C are rife with rumours about the disease. 
These include conspiracy theories about its 
origins and authenticity as well as about 
people’s own probability of getting infected 
and suffering. 
Several tropes appear to co-exist about 
the origins of Covid-19 in both countries. 
In many sites, people do not believe that 
the disease is real: ‘I know it came from 
China, but I have doubts because China 
is very developed and has the capacity to 
develop medicines.’ Some explained it as 
‘the government’s drama to get aid from the 
West.’ Others claim it is ‘a conspiracy against 
our religion’ – prompting more people to 
attend churches/temples/mosques for 
prayers (and consequently contravene social 
distancing rules).  
In Country A, the fear is focused more on 
outsiders and foreigners: ‘The disease is more 
likely to be spread from people who come 
back from abroad. As you know, rural folks are 
really afraid of such matters.’
4. ‘It’s just like flu’: beliefs that the virus isn’t a 
big risk
Intermediaries and people believe that they 
are unlikely to get the disease, and this is 
reinforced by repetition through informal 
channels. One key reason mentioned is that 
it is a disease of outsiders/rich/white people. 
For example, one person in Country B said: ‘It’s 
a foreign virus, how can we get it? We have 
not been out of the village.’
Another added, ‘It’s a virus of the rich 
people, we are poor.’ These sentiments are 
echoed in Country C: ‘I’m not going to catch 
this disease, it’s the rich man’s thing. We 
already had serious diseases and we did 
not die.’  
This was a recurring theme – of being 
resistant because they had experienced 
ill health and malnutrition. In Country B, 
some think that the virus will not affect poor 
people because the government has already 
exposed them to more lethal germs by 
housing them near dirty fords where drainage 
water flows.  
According to one intermediary, ‘our immune 
system is very strong, this is just a flu-type 
virus.’ Others noted that they would not be 
affected because they are used to consuming 
unhygienic goods – they mentioned eating 
red pepper that is adulterated with crushed 
bricks, and milk powder mixed with washing 
powder.  
In other words, if the government really 
cared and was to be trusted, it would not 
have left people in such dire health conditions.
5. Official public health rules are not the 
main drivers of behaviour
Tensions between believing official 
government information and rumours reflect 
local dilemmas and lead people to behave 
in ways that undermine efforts to contain 
Covid-19.  
In Country B, intermediaries report that 
people are not following official requirements. 
For example, they gather in groups but hide 
when the police or other officials visit. Busy 
markets quickly empty when inspection teams 
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arrive and go back to normal when they leave. 
Government efforts to increase testing face 
challenges because people avoid tests for 
fear of being diagnosed as positive and being 
forced to quarantine. 
In Country C, people are not following 
lockdown regulations, because they need to 
earn a living to survive. They know the risks, 
but ignore preventive measures, like wearing 
masks, as they cannot afford masks when 
food is scarce.
Country A is slightly unusual, as for 
the most part, people are reported to be 
following the rules, especially as cases have 
increased. However, the rules have been 
created locally – ‘every village has its own 
set of rules’. Village rules can be stricter than 
government guidelines and often it is up to 
intermediaries to negotiate and enforce them. 
Villages have also created their own security 
teams – posting guards at village entrances 
to prevent people coming in or going out 
and restricting traffic to essential only. These 
strategies reflect the belief in Country A that 
the threat is from outsiders, especially cross-
border migrants who are quarantined upon 
return to their villages.  
6. Heavy-handed responses from the police 
and security forces
Police action (or other security-related 
authorities) in response to transgressions has 
been, for the most part, heavy-handed and 
increases distrust of government. In Country 
C, police are using intimidation and threats, 
accusing people of not following social 
distancing rules or of breaking the movement 
ban: ‘the police are threatening people, they 
are extorting people especially the taxi drivers.’ 
In some locations, the local mafia have 
announced that they will kill anyone who has 
Covid-19, so people are afraid to seek health 
care even if they have other ailments, leaving 
them at risk of falling seriously ill. In Country B, 
citizen–state relations have long been shaped 
by legacies of security and policing. As one 
intermediary noted, ‘the only thing we usually 
get for free are police beatings.’ In Country 
A, a history of repression and fear of armed 
state and non-state actors have meant that 
people are afraid to break the rules lest they 
are beaten, fined or even imprisoned.  
Back to trust: how is it shaped?
Given how government responses and 
messaging get subverted due to a lack of 
trust on the ground, what can we say about 
who holds the trust of the people? 
Our research on intermediaries suggests 
that they are the primary interlocutors 
between people and higher forms of authority, 
making them key players in mediating trust. 
Overall, they seem to be using Covid-19 to 
gain or retain power in this role. They seem to 
operate in two ways: on the one hand, raising 
voices from below to get authorities’ attention 
(and competing with other intermediaries to 
do so), and organising local-level collection 
and distribution of food and social protection 
money. On the other hand, they are the 
main channels for authorities to access 
communities, as they assemble beneficiary 
lists and pass on government messages.  
Our early findings indicate that for the 
most part, people do not have a real choice 
of which intermediaries to use. However, 
intermediaries do have a choice of which 
authorities – state or non-state – they take 
people’s problems to for resolution. Their 
choice depends on a range of factors, 
including their networks, nature of the 
problems, and potential for resolution. Yet, by 
these very choices, they have the potential 
to strengthen the reputation, legitimacy and 
trust in some authorities versus others. 
Our research on 
intermediaries suggests that 
they are the primary 
interlocutors between people 
and higher forms of authority, 
making them key players in 
mediating trust.
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In Country A, intermediaries are struggling 
to navigate this space. As the situation gets 
more desperate, tensions are rising and 
they get ‘stuck’ between regulations set by 
government or non-state armed groups and 
community needs. This is severely degrading 
the relationship between communities and 
intermediaries. 
In a situation such as Covid-19, when 
governments desperately need the trust of 
the people, understanding this local-level 
dynamic seems a vital factor.
Some implications
Given the distrust of state authority, persistent 
rumours and behaviours that undermine 
efforts to contain the virus, what can 
governments, donors and other external 
actors do? We suggest three key steps that 
can help transform the situation.
1. Adapt social protection programmes to fit 
local realities
First, most countries affected by the virus 
have implemented social protection 
programmes for the poorest and most 
marginalised. For these programmes to 
work, we argue that it is key to understand 
local contexts and the role of intermediaries 
in connecting poor populations to state 
systems. This means recognising the micro-
context and the nuanced relationships 
between the actors on the ground. Working 
with intermediaries, whether formal or informal, 
who know the local populations and have an 
interest in advancing the public good seems 
critical. These grass-roots intermediaries are 
best placed to navigate any shifting political 
terrain. 
Yet governments often implement 
programmes with no understanding of the 
micro-context. In Country A, some households 
got repeated provisions and others got 
nothing, due to poor selection criteria. 
Intermediaries there wish that the government 
would stop giving misguided support. Even 
households feel that the government does 
not understand their situation. In Country B, 
some households responded to mistargeting 
by redistributing among themselves, but 
governments cannot rely on such goodwill. 
In sum, social protection has the potential to 
ensure that people adhere to the rules without 
needing to choose between starvation 
and illness, and also to strengthen trust 
in government – but only with a nuanced 
understanding of the local context.
2. Understand how messages get through to 
people
Second, how information is mediated, and 
what incentives and reach the mediators 
have must be understood. There are perverse 
dynamics in the role that some intermediaries 
may be playing in hyping up the risks, resulting 
in people not getting tested, or avoiding 
health care due to fears about catching 
Covid-19, being thought to have it, or testing 
positive and subsequently being ostracised. 
Countering these negative perceptions will 
be key to catching cases early, as well as 
preventing a larger health crisis through 
neglect of other issues. The intermediaries who 
emerge as crucial in governance issues are 
predominantly men. In some contexts, there 
may be differences between how men and 
women, or people of different ethnic identities 
or political affiliations, get their information, 
and who they trust. This warrants exploration. 
A greater understanding of intermediaries 
and their incentives is needed to find the right 
people to work with and to frame the right 
messages.
3. Frontline administration to build trust with 
citizens 
Third, nuanced understandings of the local 
context can only happen by re-orienting the 
frontline administration. In many countries 
with a colonial or military authoritarian 
legacy, the local administration treats poor 
and marginalised people as second-class 
citizens and rarely attempts to build trusted 
relationships with them. The Covid-19 crisis 
highlights the need for administrations to 
change their approach and to actively build 
trust with these populations – even if it will 
take years to change cultures and mindsets.  
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Final reflection: a response that is 
nuanced and tailored to the local 
context will go a long way towards 
strengthening trust  
We find that at the margins people make 
rational calculations, weighing the risk of 
getting Covid-19 against the risk of not 
meeting other critical needs. 
Some people we talk to do not believe 
Covid-19 is real. They absorb messages 
best through direct experience, through the 
stories of people who have been affected 
by Covid-19, and for the most part, these 
stories have not reached them. Visual 
cues and informal channels can reinforce 
messages. In Country B, where cases have 
been relatively low, people in remote areas 
get rumours about rumours: second- or 
third-hand information, with the pandemic 
seeming quite distant from their everyday 
lives. In Country C, the government only 
recently authorised local media to film and 
diffuse images of Covid-19 patients being 
treated. The reaction of colleagues of our 
researchers is illustrative – ‘wow, it is real after 
all!’ In places at high risk, authorities must 
increase awareness that Covid-19 is real, as 
people only seem to change their behaviour 
once the devastation of the illness becomes 
obvious.
On the other hand, the effect of 
restrictions on livelihoods is immediate and 
brutal. In Country A, the government closed 
international and domestic borders around 
a specific location at short notice, causing 
worries, chiefly economic, about work and 
income.  
The stress of accessing basic needs 
appears to be as bad, if not worse, as 
concern about the virus. Given these 
observations, governments should adjust 
restrictions to local risk levels. Restrictions 
for precaution’s sake do not make sense in 
circumstances where people don’t have 
reserves to draw upon. A response that is 
nuanced and tailored to the local context will 
go a long way towards strengthening trust.
